NOTABLE PHILOSOPHERS  IN THE ANIMAL RIGHTS ARGUMENT (special thanks to "Lamb" for researching and the use of select quotes).

L Petrinovich, Lewis (ANTI)  Petrinovich argues that humans possess a bundle of unique characteristics, setting them apart biologically and morally from other species. "Although Petrinovich's biologically based speciesist position is a recent contribution to animal ethics, the idea of grounding ethics in biology is not new.  Herbert Spencer applied Darwin's theory of evolution to philosophical problems in the mid 1800s [1], though in a way quite at odds with Darwin's egalitarian perspective on animals.  Closer to our time, Edward O. Wilson linked evolutionary principles with social behavior in his controversial book Sociobiology: The New Synthesis.[2] Petrinovich, a bioethicist and research scientist, contributes to the current discussion about speciesism in two important ways.  In the first place, Petrinovich, like his predecessors, gives biological evolution a central role in his ethical position.  Taking the biological natures of individuals into account is essential, I think, in our ethical theorizing.  Because an animal does not behave as we do when in pain, for example, does not justify a lack of moral concern for her pain.  As Bernard Rollin points out: "(I)t is a selective evolutionary survival advantage for a cow to eat regardless of how it feels...(A) cow that didn't graze with the rest of the herd would be flagged as vulnerable to predators." [3] Secondly, Petrinovich's argument, I think, is an attempt to provide a biological justification of the age-old and commonly held assumption that for all our similarities to animals, we are still morally distinct from them simply because we are biologically human." 1.Spencer, Herbert. The Data of Ethics. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell and Company, 1879. 2. Wilson, Edward O. Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975. 3. Rollin, Bernard E. The Unheeded Cry. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p 135. Petrinovich's Argument In Brief In Darwinian Dominion, Petrinovich argues that human beings possess a complex bundle of unique characteristics that set them apart both biologically and morally from other species.  He presents three major justifications for speciesism.  His first justification is an appeal to the emotional bonds between members of the human species that have evolved to increase the likelihood of survival and reproductive success of each neonate.  According to Petrinovich, emotional bonding between the neonate and the human community is the biological base upon which a moral distinction can be made between the neonate and animals of other species.  He says that: "(t)his base concerns the identity of the neonate as a member of our biological species, and this membership places it in a special category entitling it to treatment as a member of the social community." His second justification is an appeal to cognitive capacities that he claims are probably unique to humans and necessary for moral agency.  The criteria for moral agency, according to Petrinovich, involve the ability to understand rules, duties, obligations, and causality, as well as having a ToM (theory of mind). His third justification is an appeal to the pervasiveness of speciesism, even among philosophers like Singer and Regan, who attempt to oppose it.  He points out the inconsistencies and 'backdoor speciesism' in the positions of Singer and Regan when they draw moral comparisons between animals and humans.  "(S)peciesism becomes a basic aspect of biological reality on which the human social condition is founded." Petrinovich concludes.' Rebuttals Section 1, Q/A 5 ; Section 9, Q/A 2, 5, 6, 8; Section 15, Q/A 1-3;

M Leahy (ANTI): Leahy thinks that the young and mentally disabled have an honorary status because they're human. He says: "Attempts to convince us that the eating of meat and fish is an evil invasion of the inalienable rights of animals and that it should cease forthwith are a sham."(Leahy,M "AGAINST LIBERATION" London: Routledge, 1991, p 220). He is a contractualist (like Peter Carruthers, Peter Harrison, and Lewis Petrinovich). The social contract between humans, according to these philosophers, separates them from animals. Rebuttal section 1, Q/A 5; Section 15; 

Peter Carruthers (ANTI): says to have concern for farm and lab animals distracts from humans who alone have moral standing. Carruthers says: "Those who are committed to any aspect of the animal rights movement are thoroughly misguided. " Said giving regard to animals is moral decadence. (Carruthers, Peter "the animals issue" Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.) (Dombrowski's response to Carruthers' incorrectly taking moral sentiment to be a pie of a fixed amount-such that giving to animals leaves less for humans) Both Carruthers and Harrison are neo-Cartesians. They try to resurrect the idea that animals cannot feel pain, so we should be free to experiment on them. Rene Descartes claimed that when non human animals screamed during an experiment, it was merely the obstruction of organic gears and levers. (Harrison, Peter "Theodicy and Animal Pain" in PHILOSOPHY64, 1989.) Rebuttal section 9; section 15;

McCloskey ,HJ (ANTI) thinks that, given the benefits to humans, it's irresponsible to abandon animal experimentation. ( McCloskey,HJ 'The Moral Case for Experimentation in Animals' in MONIST 70, 1987, and 'Moral Rights and Animals' in INQUIRY 22, 1979.) Rebuttal: Section 2. Q/A 6.

Cohen, Carl (ANTI) Like McCloskey, uses the benefits excuse, (Carl Cohen and Tom Regan, "The Animal Rights Debate" New York: Rowman and Littlefield Pub, Inc, 2001.) Rebuttal: Section 2. Q/A 6.

Ryder, Richard D. Coined the term "speciesism" in 1970.  Animal Revolution. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989.

Singer, Peter. "Like Ryder, points out the parallels between racism, sexism, and speciesism.  Where individuals have similar interests, Singer argues, moral consistency requires that equal consideration be given to the interests of each individual.  Race and sex, for example, play no role in determining whether an individual has the intellectual or moral capacity to vote.  It would be a form of racism or sexism, therefore, to decide on the basis of an individual's race or sex whether or not to consider her interest in voting. On the other hand, because infants and the mentally disabled do not have the intellectual or moral capacity of normal adult humans, it makes no sense to insist that equal consideration be given to their interest in voting.  Infants and the mentally disabled, however, like normal adults, are sentient, and as such, have the capacity to feel pleasure and satisfaction.  Accordingly, moral consistency urges us to consider equally the interest of all sentient humans in avoiding pain and experiencing pleasure.  Animals, no less than human infants and the mentally disabled, Singer continues, are sentient, and as such, should be accorded comparable moral consideration.  To do otherwise, Singer argues, would be to show a bias for human beings and against animals; that is, to be a speciesist." Animal Liberation. Wellingborough: Thorsons   Publishers Limited, 1975.  Practical Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.   In Defense of Animals. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985.

Regan, Tom. "Regan's approach to animal ethics, while in one sense a challenge to that taken by Singer, is in another important sense, an affirmation of Singer's position.  Singer's animal ethics was developed within a utilitarian framework.  Singer widened the application of the utilitarian principle to include animals among those whose pleasures and pains are given impartial consideration.  Equality and impartiality are central features of Regan's rights theory, as well.  "The idea of impartiality is at the heart of...the formal principle of justice", the guiding principle of Regan's theory.  According to the formal principle of justice, similar cases should be treated similarly, different cases, differently.  Though the principle does not specify which factors are relevant in determining similarities and differences, it requires that an account be given of how we distinguish similar and dissimilar cases.  If it is claimed, for example, that suffering is wrong in the case of humans but not in that of animals, it must be shown how a biological difference makes the two cases morally dissimilar. Regan, like Singer, insists that the interests of animals and humans should be given equal consideration where they have similar interests.

Though Regan acknowledges that Singer's utilitarian account complies with the formal principle of justice, he favors a different interpretation of the principle.  According to Regan, all individuals with inherent value possess it equally.  That is, no individual, no matter how gifted intellectually, socially, or morally, has a higher degree of inherent value than any other.  "Inherent value is thus a categorical concept.  One either has it, or one does not."  Accordingly, formal justice requires that respect be shown equally to all individuals with inherent value.  Moral conflicts cannot be resolved, therefore, by determining relative inherent value, nor, indeed, by a utilitarian calculation in which an aggregate of satisfactions has more value that the satisfactions of a single individual.  Regan opposes Singer's utilitarian approach to animal ethics, therefore, because justice demands that respect be shown for the equal inherent value of individuals.  The amassed sum of inherent value of individuals in a group is no greater than that possessed by a single individual, according to Regan." The Case for Animal Rights. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. 'Animal Rights, Human Wrongs.' in Environmental Philosophy. eds. Michael Zimmerman et al. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1993.

Francione, Gary. Rutgers University. Very good debater.  Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or The Dog? Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000.

Angus Taylor: author of 'Magpies, Monkeys, and Morals' Taylor's is nice, quick and gives both sides fairly...He's a philosopher but clearly is on the animal rights side.

Daniel Dombrowski:  "Babies and Beasts" Chicago: University of Illinois, 1997.

Best, Stephen.  'God, Culture, and Women.' in Skinned. ed. Anne Doncaster. North Falmouth: International Wildlife Coalition, 1988.